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ABSTRACT  
This text aims at providing a broad analytical historiography of feminist 
engagement in international criminal law from the early 20th century until the 
formation of the modern international legal field with the drafting of the Rome 
Statute and establishment of the International Criminal Court. It traces the 
evolvement and coming of age of both the global feminist movement and the 
international criminal legal project, and the manner in which they came to 
intersect. The text outlines the modes and methods of feminist engagement in 
the field, provides a proposed model of the involvement of feminist typologies in 
international criminal law, and specifically examines the manner in which liberal 
feminism, versus others, has interacted with various areas of international law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reflection, analysis, and critique of separate and distinct areas or eras of feminist 
involvement in international criminal law are abundant, but a broad-spectrum 
analytical historiography of feminist engagement in the field has yet to be 
introduced. The intended scope of this text is for it to be an all-encompassing 
mapping of the relationship between the sphere of international criminal law and 
women’s rights, and the manner in which the feminist movement has come to exist 
and function within the international criminal legal field, with a specific examination 
of liberal feminism versus ‘other’ forms of feminism. This mapping project includes 
a historical presentation of the establishment of the separate spheres, and an 
illustration of the manner in which they came to be interrelated. It also includes an 
analysis of the positions in which the feminist movement occupied the major 
moments of international criminal law, from the early 20th century until the drafting 
of the Rome Statute and formation of the International Criminal Court. A model for 
the phases of different types of feminist engagement in international criminal law is 
presented, with an assessment of the role of liberal feminism in various fields of 
international law. 
 Chapter one offers a history of feminist engagement with international 
criminal law from the First World War to the Cold War era. It includes an 
introduction to early forms of domestic and international feminism, as well as the 
stage-setting elements for the birth of modern international criminal law, and the 
manner in which women engaged in both. Chapter two tells the story of the birth of 
the global feminist movement, centered mostly in the field of international human 
rights law. It also introduces Karen Engle’s model for feminist involvement in 
international human rights law. Chapter three illustrates the birth of modern 
2 
 
international criminal law, and the approaches and methods used by feminist 
groups to engage in the field, with an emphasis on an analysis of this period by Janet 
Halley.  Chapter four puts forth a model of feminist engagement in international 
criminal law, of liberal feminism versus ‘others’. Finally, Chapter five examines a 
proposed pattern with regards to feminist engagement in international law relating 
to the role of liberal feminists versus ‘others’. 
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I.  A History of Feminist Engagement with International Criminal Law From 
The First World War to the Cold War 
 
A.  World War I 
 
International criminal law is often associated with the era of the International 
Criminal Tribunals and the establishment of the International Criminal Court of the 
1990’s, but the development of the field of modern international criminal law can be 
traced much further back.1 However, the consolidation of the international criminal 
legal sphere is, correctly, closely linked to the establishment of international 
criminal courts, and the punishment of international crimes by these courts. It is 
perhaps because of this that the earliest antecedent to the establishment of a 
solidified body of international criminal law in twentieth century modern history 
can be traced to the World War I, the atrocities of which caused the Allies to 
convene a Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on 
Enforcement of Penalties to investigate culpable conduct by the Central Powers 
(Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) during the First 
World War.2  
1.  The Emergence of the Concept of International Criminal Responsibility 
The Commission was also tasked with considering the feasibility of placing criminal 
responsibility on particular individuals, not just on states, by setting up trials to 
investigate these crimes. In 1919, the Commission presented its final report to the 
Paris Peace Conference, which was negotiating peace agreements with the Central 
Powers.3 The report concluded that the crimes “against the laws and customs of war 
and of the laws of humanity” committed by the Central Powers should be 
 
1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 540-566 (M. Cherif 
Bassiouni ed., Koninklijke Brill NV, 2nd ed. 2013) (2003) [hereinafter Bassiouni]. 
2 Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 541. 
3 Id. 
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prosecuted before an “international high tribunal”.4 On June 28 1919, the Versailles 
Peace Treaty, requiring Germany to accept full responsibility for instigating the war 
and to pay reparations to compensate for this, was signed.5 Most important for the 
purpose of tracing the foundations of international criminal law are Articles 227-
229 of the Versailles Peace Treaty.6 Article 227 charged Kaiser Wilhelm II, the 
former German Emperor, with “supreme offence against international morality and 
the sanctity of treaties”, and sanctioned the creation of a special tribunal to try the 
accused.7 Articles 228 and 229 allowed for the creation of special military tribunals 
to try individuals accused of the commission of “acts in violation of the laws and 
customs of war”.8 By the time the Versailles Treaty entered into force, however, the 
former German Emperor had fled, and thus Article 227 was never enforced; neither 
were Articles 228 and 229, as the Allies’ resolve to enforce individual criminal 
responsibility seemed to dissipate in the immediate postwar period.9 The World 
War I experiment with international criminal justice was thus short-lived.  
The period following World War I included the establishment of the League 
of Nations, meant to “safeguard the peace of nations”, which featured its own 
judicial branch, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)—the precursor 
of today’s International Court of Justice of the United Nations.10 In 1920, an advisory 
commission for the League of Nations proposed a recommendation to create a 
permanent international criminal court, which was to have jurisdiction over “crimes 
 
4 THE COMMISSION ON THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE AUTHORS OF THE WAR AND ON 
ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES, REPORT OF COMMISSION TO DETERMINE WAR GUILT, 6 MAY 
1919.  
5 GERHARDE WERLE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 1-13 (TMC Asser Press) 
(2005) [hereinafter Werle].  
6 Werle, supra note 5 at 3. 
7 The Treaty of Versailles art. 227, 1919. 
8 The Treaty of Versailles art. 228-229, 1919. 
9 Werle, supra note 5 at 5.  
10 Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 544. 
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constituting a breach of international public order or against the universal law of 
nations”.11 This proposal, however, was rejected and deemed “premature” by the 
League of Nations, with the sentiment that the PCIJ had already been created as a 
judicial branch of the League of Nations with civil jurisdiction over states.12  
2.  World War I and Women 
An important facet of the peace treaties that ended the First World War was the use 
the extensive use of plebiscites employed in Central and Eastern Europe to 
determine the boundaries of newly created nation states. While, by the end of the 
nineteenth century, they had come to be “abandoned by diplomats, condemned by 
the majority of writers on international law, and forgotten by the world at large”, 
plebiscites, and the underlying principle of self-determination, were promoted as 
the foundation for the creation of new frontiers drawn during the Paris Peace 
Conference of 1919.13 However, plebiscites were also a significant moment for 
women, in that they marked the first time women had the right to contribute to 
expressions of popular sovereignty at the international level. In light of the fact that 
women’s suffrage was still a contentious issue in most of Europe and the United 
States (in fact, only two of the five powers constituting the Supreme Council at the 
Paris Peace Conference—Britain and the United States—were even close to 
enshrining women’s right to vote), it was notable that women were able to vote in 
all plebiscites held during the post-World War I peace process.14  
Women’s groups attempted to play a role in the post-World War I peace 
settlement negotiations, and sought to be involved in the general post-World War I 
atmosphere conducive to the formation of the plebiscites and women’s equal 
 
11 Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 545. 
12 Id. 
13 Karen Knop, Of the Male Persuasion: The Power of Liberal Internationalism for Women, 93 AM SOC 
OF INTL LAW 177, 177-185 (1999) [hereinafter Knop]. 
14 Knop, supra note 13, at 179. 
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participation in them.15 International women’s organizations had begun forming 
long before the Paris Peace Conference, and a multitude of international conferences 
composed of women were convened with the sole goal of having an influence in the 
peace process.16 The leaders of the international women’s movement during the 
immediate post-World War I period, at the time predominantly white, Western, well 
educated, and well-connected (thus benefiting from a substantial degree of contact 
with the statesmen and diplomats who most influenced the peace process), lobbied 
the delegations to the Paris Peace Conference on issues pertaining to the peace 
process and the proposed League of Nations, particularly in the area of women’s 
rights.17 
3.  The Early Days of the Modern Feminist Movement 
The issue of women’s right to vote in the plebiscites was related to two key 
initiatives, the first of which was the campaign for women’s suffrage, mainly in 
Europe and the United States.18 For example, in the United States, the campaign for 
women’s suffrage seized the opportunity when President Wilson made various 
proclamations on self-determination during the post-war peace process to highlight 
the duplicity between Wilson’s famous promotion of democracy abroad and his 
administration’s apathy towards women’s suffrage in the United States19. The 
second initiative closely connected to women’s right to vote in the plebiscites was 
that of the women’s peace movement and their advocacy of their principle of self-
determination.20 This initiative is also an illustration of one of the earliest significant 
divides amongst feminist activism at the international level. While the radical 
 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id, at 180. 
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suffrage movement, exemplified by the militant National Women’s Party (NWP), 
attempted to integrate the principle of self-determination into the basis for women’s 
suffrage, the pacifist suffrage movement instead approached the matter by 
integrating women’s suffrage into the principle of self-determination.21 In 1914, 
Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence popularized feminist pacifism.22 Pethick-Lawrence had 
been part of the British radical suffrage movement, but had separated from the 
movement over disagreements with the radical suffrage movement’s leader, 
Emmeline Pankhurst, over Pankhurst’s use of violence in campaigning for women’s 
right to vote.23  
Pethick-Lawrence’s feminist pacifism combined a proposal for permanent 
peace with the basic ideology of the women’s suffrage movement.24 The proposal 
included the principle of self-determination and the advocacy for the use of 
plebiscites during the peace process.25 To combine both platforms, the pacifist 
suffrage movement, with the leadership of Pethick-Lawrence, lobbied the 
delegations at the Paris Peace Conference for the inclusion of women’s suffrage in 
plebiscites to determine the division of territories.26 In general, the radical and 
pacifist suffrage movements used highly contrasting platforms for the advocacy of 
women’s right to vote. On one hand, radical radical suffragettes endeavored to 
highlight the inconsistency of equal voting rights between men and women based on 
the portrayal of women as equally contributive towards patriotism and militarism.27 
On the other hand, pacifist suffragettes appealed not to women’s “sameness”, but by 
 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id, at 182. 
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stressing on women’s difference, and linking women to ideals of peace.28 Pacifist 
suffrages argued that women were more naturally inclined towards peace, 
especially given the societal roles they played, and would thus further the goal of a 
successful peace process.29 Therefore, the argument was based on the need for 
women’s equal voice in the process of self-determination and democracy in general.  
It was the pacifist platform—the liberal strand of feminism that existed at the 
time—that had relatively more success during the post-World War I peace 
process.30 In an official hearing before the commission on the League of Nations, the 
International Women Suffrage Alliance, composed of mainly pacifist suffragists from 
the Allied states, called for the admission of women into all permanent bodies of the 
League, granting women’s suffrage, and the prohibition on the trafficking of women 
and children.31 The only noteworthy outcome of this, however, was that Article 7 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations stated that all positions in the League were to 
be open to women, although the goal of including a provision on women’s suffrage 
did not succeed.32 By 1937, the advocacy of several women’s organizations led to 
the League’s General Assembly forming a Committee of Experts to conduct a 
comprehensive inquiry into the legal status of women worldwide, with the purpose 
of promulgating a convention specifically codifying women’s rights.33 However, the 
work of the Committee was short-lived, as World War II broke out soon afterwards. 
Nonetheless, by the time the war erupted, a growing discourse of women’s equality 
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id, at 183. 
33 Id. 
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was emerging through the advocacy of various international women’s 
organizations.34  
B.  World War II: The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals 
The various failures of the League of Nations, originally meant to prevent the 
outbreak of world war once again, exposed the weaknesses of the organization, 
especially throughout the 1930’s, and eventually led to the outbreak of World War II 
in 1939.35 The post-World War II period was a critical point that marked a change of 
course for international criminal law. This period brought about the establishment 
of two international tribunals for the prosecution of international crimes: the 
International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals (the 
IMT, often known as the Nuremberg Tribunal), and the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East (the IMTFE, or Tokyo Tribunal).36 These tribunals, 
established by the Allies, were to prosecute high level Germany and Japanese 
military and civilian authorities whose crimes “had no particular geographic 
localization”.37 International judicial proceedings before these tribunals were a 
catalyst for the commission of hundreds of trials before various military and civilian 
tribunals in the many zones of occupation in Europe and the Pacific.38 The 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters were drafted to outline the jurisdictions and 
capacities of the respective tribunals.39   
The Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, under Articles 6(a) and 5(a), 
respectively, gave the tribunals the jurisdiction to prosecute for “crimes against the 
peace”, which were defined as the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a 
 
34 Id. 
35 Bassiouni, supra note 1, at 549. 
36 Id. 
37 Id, at 551. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
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war against aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances”.40 These prosecutable war crimes, defined in subsection (b) of the 
respective articles, included “murder, ill-treatment of deportation to slave labor or 
for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder or 
ill-treatment of prisoners of war of persons in the seas, killing of hostages, plunder 
of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, town or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity”41. Subsection (c) of the respective 
articles also gave the courts the jurisdiction to prosecute “crimes against humanity”, 
defined as “murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or 
persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection 
with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of 
the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”.42  
 The Nuremberg Tribunal tried 21 Nazi leaders, three of whom were 
acquitted, seven were sentence to prison terms, and the remaining 11 were 
sentenced to death.43 As for the Tokyo Tribunal, which tried 25 Japanese 
defendants, seven of whom were sentenced to death, and the remaining of whom 
received prison sentences.44 While the development and outcome of the Nuremberg 
and Tokyo tribunals are essential milestones in the development of international 
criminal law, the majority of post-World War II prosecutions did not actually occur 
before these two tribunals, but were instead carried out by the Allied powers in 
 
40 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, 82 UNTS 279; 59 Stat. 1544; 3 Bevans 1238; 39 AJILs 
258 (1945). 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  
43 Werle, supra note 5, at 8. 
44 Id, at 11. 
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their respective zones of occupation.45 A fundamental example of this was Allied 
Control Council Law No. 10, largely a reflection of the Nuremberg Charter, which 
resulted in 12 important United States-authorized trials in Germany.46 A key 
contribution of Control Council Law No. 10, which still has an effect in international 
criminal law today, was the elimination of the nexus to war crimes or crimes against 
peace required by the Nuremberg Charter to prosecute crimes against humanity.47 
In total, the combined trials commissioned by the Allied powers in their respective 
occupation zones resulted in more than five thousand trials for German and 
Japanese authorities indicted for the commission of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.48  
 It is vital to recognize the immense significance of the post-World War II 
period to the development of the field of international criminal law. Collectively, the 
various aforementioned legal proceedings established several core principles of 
modern international criminal law, and tribunals several decades later continued to 
cite the outcomes of these proceedings as key legal precedent. Most importantly, the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals established the concept that many violations of the 
law of war, or international humanitarian law, which had previously only held states 
liable for responsibility, also, with these tribunals, gave rise to individual criminal 
responsibility for the participation in the commission of these crimes. Moreover, the 
two tribunals ascertained, and codified, the primacy of international law over 
domestic law—while the conduct many defendants were accused for was 
authorized by domestic law, the Charters of both tribunals highlighted that crimes 
 
45 Id, at 12. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
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against humanity, especially, were prosecutable and punishable “whether or not in 
violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated”.49  
Furthermore, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters officially codified the 
promulgation of two new, and crucial to the international criminal field, groups of 
crimes: crimes against the peace and crimes against humanity.50 While the inclusion 
of these crimes was controversial in terms of the legality principle of international 
law, nullum crimes sine lege, nulla poene sine lege (individuals cannot be punished 
for conduct that had not been deemed a crime at the time of the commission of the 
act), the Tribunals, Nuremberg in particular, ruled that this objection was 
inapplicable in light of the magnitude of the nature and degree of the atrocities 
committed.51 When defendants in the Nuremberg trials argued that they could not, 
under international law, be prosecuted for certain acts which were not technically 
crimes under international law at the time these acts were committed, the 
Tribunal’s response was that “crimes against international law are committed by 
men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such 
crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced”.52  
 Finally, the Tribunals confirmed that “individuals have international duties 
which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual 
State”—and thus rejected previously held common law doctrines of the immunity of 
sovereigns and heads of state that could have removed liability from particular 
defendants, or that individuals executing superior orders should be acquitted.53 The 
Tribunals also set the precedent for not only convicting civilian and military 
 
49 Bassiouni, supra note 1 at 560. 
50 Beth Van Schaack & Ron Slye, A Concise History of International Criminal Law 34-38 (Saint Clara 
University School of Law, 2007) [hereinafter Van Schaack]. 
51 Van Schaack, supra note 50, at 35. 
52 Id. 
53 Id, at 37. 
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authorities, but private actors as well, such as financiers and industrialists, for their 
participation in war crimes and crimes against humanity.54 Collectively, the 
principles and precedents emerging from the post-World War II tribunals, now 
known as the “Nuremberg principles”, have formatively shaped the field of 
international criminal law. 
C.  The War is Over: Now What? 
1.  Post WW II: The United Nations Charter 
The post-World War II period ushered in an upsurge of optimism and belief in the 
power of law and international judicial institutions in the protection of populations 
and the reigning in of state violence. However, a period of stagnation in the 
development of the field of international criminal law set in with the onset of the 
Cold War, relatively soon after the post-World War II period. Nonetheless, this 
stagnation did not occur immediately. The United Nations, with its Charter 
outlawing the use of force under Article 2(4), was established.55 The United Nations 
Charter was also the first international agreement to assert the equality of men and 
women’s rights as a fundamental human right.56 Among the purposes of the United 
Nations Charter, as stated in Article 1, is “To achieve international cooperation…in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms 
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”57 The drafting 
process at the United Nations Conference on International Organization in San 
Francisco in 1945 was attended by nine women’s organizations, a tiny portion of the 
 
54 Id. 
55 Torild Skard, Getting Our History Right: How were the Equal Rights of Men and Women Included in 
the Charter of the United Nations? 37-60 (Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Paper No. 1, 
2008). 
56 Skard, supra note 55, at 38.  
57 U.N. Charter art. 1, para.3. 
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160 organizations that participated in the Conference.58 Even then, there were clear 
divides amongst the small number of feminist organizations, mainly based along 
nationality lines. Latin American women’s groups, who had only recently emerged 
from or were still in the process of struggling for political rights in their own 
countries, were insistent on the specific inclusion of women’s equality as a founding 
principle for this new international organization.59 On the other hand, American, 
British, and Canadian groups rejected the notion of singling out women in the 
language of human rights, insisting that this would lead to the further segregation of 
women, and viewed the Latin American stance as reminiscent of early 20th century 
militant feminism.60 The final equality clause of the Charter was a compromise 
between both sides, led by Chinese and Norwegian women’s groups who occupied 
an “in between” position.61  
 Moreover, besides the codification of a general equality clause between men 
and women in the Charter, no mention of the manner in which women had 
specifically suffered during World War II, and conflict in general, was made in the 
Charter or in the peace agreements following the war.62 For example, what is 
estimated to be between 100,000 and 200,000 women were made to be “comfort 
women” for Japanese troops by being forced into government-sanctioned military 
brothels during World War II.63 During subsequent peace agreements, these 
“comfort women” were not referred to during peace agreements with Japan, nor 
were they included under the prisoner of war clause in article 16 of the Peace 
 
58 Id, at 43. 
59 Id, at 47. 
60 Id, at 48. 
61 Id, at 49.  
62 Rhonda Copelon, Gender Crimes as War Crimes: Integrating Crimes against Women into 
International Criminal Law, 46 McGill L.J. 217, 217-240 (2000). 
63 Copelon, supra note 61, at 221. 
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Treaties with Japan, which provides for indemnification of prisoners of war who 
“suffered undue hardship”.64 
2.  Post WWII: The Genocide Convention and the Geneva Conventions 
The immediate post-World War II era was also witness to the promulgation 
of the 1948 Genocide Convention and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the 
protection of the wounded, shipwrecked, prisoners of war, and civilians in times of 
conflict.65 The proliferation of these key treaties substantiated a newfound 
expectation for the establishment of individual criminal responsibility for breaches 
of international law. The Geneva Conventions, especially, codified the various war 
crimes under the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters, identifying them as “grave 
breaches”, a category of crimes that carried on throughout the promulgation of 
various instruments in international law.66 The Genocide Convention and Geneva 
Conventions ushered in the promulgation of various other multilateral treaties 
prohibiting torture, various forms of terrorism, and war crimes in non-international 
armed conflict.67  
3. Post WWII: Early Attempts at the Formation of an International Criminal Court 
 The immediate post-war period also bore witness to efforts by members of 
the international community to build a permanent judicial institution to prosecute 
international crimes—one that not was dependant upon victors’ justice—apart from 
the International Court of Justice, the judicial branch of the United Nations, the 
jurisdiction of which was only over states.68 Thus, in 1947, the General Assembly 
established the International Law Commission (ILC) to promote the development 
and codification of public international law, but also requested of the Commission to 
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study “the desirability and possibility of establishing an international judicial organ 
for the trial of persons charged with genocide or other crimes”, the subject matter of 
jurisdiction of which would incorporate the Nuremberg and Tokyo principles.69 In 
other areas of international law, the international community also worked towards 
creating a structured field of international human rights law, which in many ways 
constituted a product of the crimes against humanity charge at Nuremberg.70  
4. Post WWII: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Covenants  
In 1948, the landmark Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, 
and followed in 1966 by two Covenants, one protecting civil and political rights, and 
the other economic, social, and cultural rights.71 Women’s participation in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights came mainly through the participation of the 
female delegates of the Commission on the Status of Women (CSW), which was 
established by the United Nations in 1946 as a mechanism for monitoring and 
promoting the rights of women.72 The first draft of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights displayed a high degree of gender insensitivity. For example, its first 
article began with the statement “All men are brothers”.73 The CSW, called to the 
drafting table due to initially minor concerns about possible gender bias in the 
language of the Declaration, worked towards ensuring a gender-neutral language of 
the text (changing the aforementioned statement, for example, first to apply to “all 
people” and finally to “all human beings”), as well as contributing to debates on 
Article 16 and 25, related to marriage and family status.74 The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
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and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, all 
explicitly prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, but further than that, little of 
the provisions of these treaty specifically addressed women.75 
D. The Cold War Era 
1. The Stagnation of International Criminal Law and Establishment of Feminist Legal 
Theory 
With the onset of the Cold War, the first major crisis of which began with the 
Berlin Blockade in 1948, work on the codification of international human rights 
norms, and the codification of international law in general, either slowed down 
considerably or come to a standstill. In particular, the proposed project for the 
creation of a permanent international criminal court called for by the General 
Assembly came to a halt, mainly because delegates of the Assembly were unable to 
agree on a concise definition of the “crime of aggression” while the world witnessed 
proxy wars by the United States and the Soviet Union throughout the developing 
world.76 Domestically, however, the 1960’s ushered in a crucial era for feminist 
activism. A new wave of feminism, dubbed ‘second wave’ feminism (as opposed to 
the ‘first wave’ of feminist activity centered around gaining women’s suffrage), 
began in the United States in the 1960’s and broadened the women’s rights debate 
to issues of sexuality, family, the workplace, reproductive rights, and various legal 
and de facto inequalities.77 The movement, while closely connected to the civil rights 
movement and the antiwar movement in the United States, eventually spread 
throughout Europe and certain states in Asia.78 In the United States, ‘second wave’ 
feminism also led to a dramatic increase in the number of female students and 
 
75 Id, at 92.  
76 Van Schaack, supra note 50, at 41. 
77 Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of the California Law 
Review, 100 CAL L. REV. 381, 381-429 (2012). 
78 Bartlett, supra note 76, at 383. 
18 
 
faculty in law schools in the 1970’s, and for the first time, law schools offered 
specific courses on women and law.79 This new legal movement, led by an up and 
coming generation of women’s rights lawyers, was exhibited through an 
interrelated combination practice and theory, now know as feminist legal theory.80  
Feminist legal theory emerged as a response to the feminist belief in the 
inadequacy existing legal theories’ understanding of the situation of women vis-à-
vis the law.81 Feminist legal theory is based on the idea that the law, as it stands, has 
been a fundamental participant in the historical subordination of women. While 
feminist jurisprudence attempts to illustrate the manner in which the law has 
contributed towards women’s subordination, feminist legal theory seeks to reform 
the status of women through modifying the law and its approach to gender.82 An 
understanding of existing feminist legal theories is crucial in understanding the 
feminist project on the international legal level. Feminist theories can be presented 
in a variety of different manners, and it must be stressed that feminist scholars, and 
ideas, rarely fit neatly into any one specific feminist category. A rough typology of 
legal feminism, or a charting of the major “schools” of feminist legal theory, 
however, may prove useful in studying the manner legal feminism is reflected in the 
international sphere.  
2. Schools of Feminist Legal Theory 
One school of feminist legal theory is liberal feminism, which often phrases 
its arguments in terms of individual rights and usually accepts the language and 
goals of existing domestic legal orders.83 The primary goal of liberal feminist is to 
 
79 Id, at 384. 
80 Id. 
81 HILARY CHARLESWORTH AND CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 38-337 (Manchester University Press 2000). 
82 Charlesworth, supra note 81, at 38. 
83 Id, at 39. 
19 
 
achieve equality between men and women in the public sphere, in areas such as 
political participation and representation, and equality in terms of paid employment 
and educational opportunities.84 Liberal feminist Sandra Harding describes the 
school’s platform as the idea that “bad law is the problem, not law-as-usual”.85 
Liberal feminism has been criticized for being inadequate in “transform[ing] a world 
in which the distribution of goods is structured along gender lines”, in that “the 
promise of equality as ‘sameness’ to men only gives women access to a world 
already constituted by men and with the parameters determined by them”.86  
Another school of feminist legal theory, ‘difference’ feminism, is concerned 
with the identification of the traits and perspectives classified as being particular to 
women, and emphasizes the notion that women’s subordination allows them to 
produce more complete and precise accounts of nature and social life that are 
“morally and scientifically preferable” to those formulated by men.87 Difference 
feminist approaches have been controversial due to the theory’s insinuation that 
women are “naturally” endowed with certain qualities, which can actually 
perpetuate inequality.88 Moreover, critics of the theory, such as Catherine 
Mackinnon, have questioned the legitimacy of qualities categorically grouped under 
“the feminine”, stating that what is deemed “feminine” is actually defined by a 
patriarchal structure.89 
A different perspective on feminist legal theory comes from radical feminism, 
which explains women’s subjugation and inequality—presented as both political 
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and sexual inequality—as a direct cause of men’s domination of women.90 Catherine 
Mackinnon has been a consistent advocate of this approach, arguing that social 
relations are organized in a manner “that men may dominate and women must 
submit”, and that the law directly subordinates women by maintaining a 
hierarchical system based on sex.91 Mackinnon’s arguments have been controversial 
both within and outside feminist circles, especially with regards to questions of how 
Mackinnon can identify as an “authentic woman’s voice” in a world she describes as 
completely controlled by men.92 Other criticism have been made regarding radical 
feminism taking an essentialist position without taking into consideration other 
influencing factors such as race or sexuality.93  
On the other hand, another school of legal theory, post-modern feminism, is 
cynical of modern, universal theoretical accounts of women’s inequality and instead 
seek to incorporate “the fractured identities of modern life”.94 Carol Smart, a strong 
exponent of post-modern feminism, for example, has doubted the utility of “Grand 
Feminist Theory” in achieving women’s equality in that these constructions, 
according to post-modern feminism, “do not capture the contextualization and 
partial nature of our knowledge”.95 Proponents of this approach advise avoiding 
broad, conceptual theories and instead concentrating on the different realities of 
women’s experiences, and examining the inconsistencies and contradictions in legal 
rule with regards to gender.96 Post-modern feminism finds that the law does not 
function in a monolithic way to subjugate women, and thus the idea of telling “one 
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true story” of the law’s subordination of women should be avoided.97 Certain 
feminist activists and scholars, however, have criticized post-modern feminism for 
focusing on “localized narratives [that] produce too weak a discourse to respond to 
the global structure of continued oppression of women”.98  
Feminist theories have not been limited to Western feminists, or feminists 
from the “North”. Third world feminism refers to feminist theories developed by 
both women in the “South” as well as women of color in the “North”.99 Third world 
feminist approaches have taken a variety of different forms depending on different 
historical perspectives, and are often based on contexts of nationalist struggle.100 
Third world feminists often criticize feminist theories originating from the North for 
their “wholesale application of Western feminist theories” both domestically and 
internationally, especially liberal feminism’s approach towards the elimination of 
sex discrimination.101 Third world feminists argue that while gender, as a factor on 
its own, may be the main influencing factors in the subordination of women in the 
West, third world women also have to cope with key additional causing factors that 
include their subjugation based on race and imperialism.102 More recently, third 
world feminist movements have moved from strong links to nationalist struggles to 
focusing on the influence of poverty on the inequality of women.103 Thus, they argue 
that feminism, as an entire movement, must broaden its agenda to more than solely 
women’s oppression based on sex, and must incorporate the interrelated factors of 
gender, race, class, colonialism, and global capitalism.104 
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 In terms of tangible outcomes, it was liberal feminism that was able to lay 
claim to most of the success stories of second wave feminism in the United States. 
With regards to legislation, the liberal feminist movement was at the forefront in 
advocating for, and realizing, legislation related to gender-based discrimination. One 
of the most famous pieces of legislation that arose from the domestic liberal feminist 
movement in the United States was the Equal Pay Act of 1963, which made gender-
based wage discrimination illegal.105 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII of which 
prohibited employers from discrimination on the basis of gender, as well as race, 
color, religion, or national origin, was a key achievement of the civil rights 
movement, the feminists of which were mainly of the liberal strand. However, it has 
been argued that “radical feminists…created the atmosphere of urgency in which 
liberal feminists were finally able to pass the Equal Rights Amendment through 
Congress and most of the states.”106 Perhaps this is true—radical feminists were 
from absent throughout second wave feminism. It was radical feminists who were 
responsible for famously staging various forms of theatrical activism in 1969 
against the portrayal of women in the Miss America Pageants, for example.107 In 
general, radical feminists during this time period did produce “a prodigious output 
of leaflets, pamphlets, journals, magazine article, newspaper and radio and TV 
interviews”.108 But who was it that was able to get results? The liberals. 
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II. The Birth of the Global Feminist Movement and Feminist Engagement in 
International Human Rights Law 
A.  The Globalization of Feminism 
1.  The Early Years 
National women’s movements in a number of countries, not just within the United 
States, during the 1970’s prompted the more noticeable emergence of women’s 
rights on the international agenda. In 1975 in Mexico City, 1980 in Copenhagen, and 
1985 in Nairobi, the United Nations organized three world conferences on the status 
of women, indicating the start, middle, and end of the UN-sponsored “Decade for 
Women”.109 The official themes of this Decade were both equality and development, 
but the majority of the weight continued to be about general and widely 
encompassing measures of social development rather than violations of individual 
women’s rights.110 Reference to women’s rights during these conferences was 
primarily made in the context of under-development. Issues of women’s rights at 
the conferences were also often connected with a variety of highly charged political 
issues, such as East-West hostility and the Palestinian question, which “deflected 
attention from the whole issue of women’s rights”.111  
The Declaration on the Equality of Women and their contribution to 
Development and Peace that emerged in Mexico in 1975 began the process of 
women’s increased inclusion in international human rights law by incorporating 
declarations of women’s equal rights and responsibilities with regards to society, 
family, and employment and “all other rights to full and satisfying economic 
activity”, as well as freedom of choice on issues of matrimony and reproductive 
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rights.112 The stated standard of the Declaration was equality with men.113 At the 
World Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1980, continued emphasis was 
made on the interrelatedness of inequality and under-development. Significantly, 
the topic of violence against women began being discussed in Copenhagen; 
however, the framework of the discussions was not women’s human rights, but 
domestic violence in social and health contexts.114  
The fact that the narrative regarding women’s issues had yet to be fully 
linked to the issue of human’s rights, or women’s human rights, is significant in that 
in 1979, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) had been adopted by the General Assembly by 130 votes to none, 
with ten abstentions.115 The text of the Convention was prepared mainly by working 
groups within the CSW, as well as a working group of the Third Committee of the 
General Assembly between 1976 and 1979.116 Drafting of the Convention was 
promoted during the UN Conference in Mexico City in 1975, where calls had been 
made for the promulgation of a convention on the elimination of discrimination 
against women, with “effective procedures for implementation”, with the General 
Assembly pushing for the completion of the Convention in time for the conference in 
Copenhagen in 1980.117  
While the Convention was conveyed by the General Assembly to be a 
reformative instrument for women’s rights, reception of the Convention varied. The 
mainstream view held by most participants in the drafting process, namely women 
of the CSW and the independent monitoring body composed of 23 elected experts, 
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was that it was instrumental in the advancement of women’s rights in that it aimed 
at establishing previously non-existent stands for women’s rights on a global level, 
providing a universal definition for discrimination against women, and helping 
“make violence against women a human rights issue”. However, CEDAW was not a 
unanimously celebrated instrument—considerable critique of the Convention came 
from both within and outside feminist circles. Certain critics find that CEDAW “failed 
to create gender equality because its scope remains limited to women” and that its 
“focus on women enshrines an understanding of sex as a binary of men/women 
with a perpetrator victim relationship”.118 Similarly, feminist international law 
scholar Hilary Charlesworth has applied this critique to the establishment of a 
“women’s branch” human rights law in general, stating that doing so has allowed for 
its marginalization and that it has further perpetuated a situation whereby 
“mainstream human rights institutions have tended to ignore the application of 
human rights norms to women”.119 Critiques of CEDAW have also come from a third 
world feminist perspective that have voiced concerns of cultural relativism, in that 
the Convention “fails to recognize those rights that a woman may possess in relation 
to her group membership in her class, her caste, and her ethnic group that may in 
fact be more beneficial to her well-being in that society”.120 These objections were 
most significantly exemplified by tensions between drafting members from 
developed and developing countries over the issue of female circumcision. As per 
the aspirations of the General Assembly, however, CEDAW had been adopted before 
the start of the UN Conference on Women in Copenhagen in 1980.121  
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At the UN Conferences on Women in Mexico City and Copenhagen, as well as 
later in Nairobi, large numbers of women’s NGOs attended from various regions of 
the world and were a driving force behind the discussions at these conferences. 
During the first two UN conferences on women, disputes arose between different 
women’s groups—for Western liberal feminists, the significant feminist issues of 
interest were sexual rights, reproductive freedom, and equality before the law. For 
third world feminists, however, priorities were largely political and socio-
economic—these included issues such as poverty, armed conflict, and neocolonialist 
domination.122 However, with the global restructuring of capitalism during the early 
1980’s, feminist activists around the world were faced with new economic, political, 
and ideological challenges. In response to these challenges, the international 
women’s movement began taking on a transnational character, and the solidarity of 
feminist activists across border became a key feature of the global feminist 
movement.  
2.  Feminism Goes Global 
The 1980’s was a decade that witnessed new forms of governance and forms 
of activism at the global level, as well as shifts in the global political economy. New 
governance structures included the growing power and influence of neo-liberal 
policies that began to be used by multinational corporations, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as regional 
blocks such as the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA).123 These institutions were primarily behind restructuring shifts in the 
global economy from state-centered economic models to free-market economic 
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approaches in the First World, the shift from socialism to capitalism in the Second 
World, and structural adjustment programs that were advocated for the Third 
World.124 Parallel to the reformation of the global economic system, the 1980’s was 
a period that was also witnessed the emergence of a transnational fundamentalist 
movement, mostly in the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia, that aimed at 
curtailing Western political influences and reclaiming traditional social and gender 
norms.125 The response to these various shifts in the overall global structure was 
collective transnational action taken by various groups that focused mainly on 
human rights, the environment, and global economic equality.126 Women, 
participants of this vast movement of transnational activism, began to organize and 
unite across borders also in response to changing world modes of organization.127 
Thus, the UN conference on women held in Nairobi in 1985 came at a time when a 
shift was occurring in the nature and direction of international feminist activism. 
The 1985 Nairobi Conference began expanding the consciousness of 
women’s human rights in its discussions about the human rights of women in 
minority groups and indigenous populations, but the rhetoric was mainly targeted 
towards guarantees of social, economic, and cultural rights rather than their rights 
as women.128 However, progress was made at Nairobi in the contextualization of the 
topic of violence against women as part of the sphere of women’s human rights. The 
conference called for legal measures to prevent violence against women.129 
However, the proposition was for “national machinery” to deal with the matter, and 
there remained a lack of a formal suggestion to hold perpetrators accountable 
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through judicial processes, or place any prescribed responsibility on states to 
protect women.130  
It was mainly third-world women’s NGOs that emphasized the importance of 
a law-centered approach with regards to the status of women.131 The members of 
these NGOs, mainly third world feminists, highlighted the notion that law, and the 
legal protection of human rights, was not only a repressive barrier to the equality of 
women, but a key tool that could be used for transformation.132 Nevertheless, while 
these activists were able to raise consciousness on the important interrelationship 
of the law and women’s rights, and while the notion of legal approaches was well 
received in Nairobi, concerns remained that a legal approach, alone, would be 
insufficient without an accompanying vision of social transformation.133 It was also 
at this time, during the mid-1980s, that feminist consensus making was being made 
across both regional and ideological divisions. A women’s movement of a new type 
had emerged: the transnational feminist movement.134 
 Thus, while women’s organizations, even when participating in international 
conferences, had previously been restricted to domestically based organizations 
that worked on localized community concerns at the grassroots level, the 1980’s 
marked the start of a shift in this dynamic whereby women began making 
connections between the local and global level. A prime example of this is the 
manner in which violence came to be discussed at the UN conferences on women. 
Discussions around violence against women first emerged as a community-based 
narrative, and this was the case up until the 1980 conference in Copenhagen. In 
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Nairobi in 1985, however, the issue was framed as a global one.135 In addition, the 
fact that it was becoming organizationally easier for local activist groups to form 
networks with one another meant that the 1980’s was a decade of increased 
transnational activism in general. Therefore, this phenomenon was not only 
restricted to women, rather, environmental and other social movements changed 
from being domestic-based to evolving into gaining a transnational character.136 
With regards to women’s movements, however, the start of framing the issue of 
violence against women as a human-rights issue, a development that occurred in 
Nairobi in 1985, was also a key factor in the framing of women’s rights in general as 
a transnational concept.137  
B. Feminist Activism in International Human Rights Law: Karen Engle 
Feminist scholar Karen Engle has described the period of time between 1985 
and 1990 as a time of “liberal inclusion” for feminist activism, theory, and critique of 
international human rights law, with “liberal inclusionist” feminists arguing that 
women should, and could, be significantly incorporated in the international human 
rights field.138 The assumption, therefore, was that women should be treated as 
subjects of international law just as men were, and that international law, if 
properly applied, could successfully incorporate women’s rights issues. The main 
narrative, according to Engle, of the liberal inclusion period was for “doctrinal 
inclusion and institutional expansion”.139 Liberal inclusionists believed that women, 
in principle were protected from a variety of concerns under international law: from 
rape in armed conflict under international humanitarian law, and from domestic 
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violence, clitoridectomy, and health abuses by international human rights law. For 
these feminists at the time, if international law was not being used to protect 
women’s rights, it was not because of a lack of existing protective law, but a lack of 
enforcement.140  
 Some liberal inclusionists focused on enforcement. Others attempted to 
analyze why international institutions did not adequately protect women’s rights. 
Certain feminists of the liberal inclusion phase suggested that increasing the 
number of women at these organizations might lead to increased focus on women’s 
issues.141 Others argued that efforts should be made to ensure international 
institutions recognized that since international law protected women, the mandates 
of these international institutions must reflect this. Overall, the belief was that the 
suitable people, or enough attention being addressed to the right issues, in this 
institutions would inevitably lead to increased importance being given to women’s 
human rights concerns.142  
 Engle describes as a second phase in feminist activism and critique of 
international human rights law, that of structural bias. It is important to note that 
Engle emphasizes the fact that these stages overlap, and that certain aspects of each 
stage can be found in others. Engle places the structural bias stage between 1987 
and 1995, when structural bias critics of international human rights law asserted 
that the simple inclusion of women into the international law structure as it existed 
was impossible.143 These feminists argued that international law was male in 
nature, and, in turn, structurally biased against women.144 Therefore, the structural 
bias approach was, in and of itself, a critique of the liberal inclusionist approach. 
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Structural bias feminists emphasized that since international law as it stood could 
never allow for the integration of women, the entire international legal structure 
had to be changed.145 While completely differing in basic beliefs about international 
law, structural bias feminists focused on many of the same concerns as liberal 
inclusion feminists, including domestic violence, clitoridectomy, and the law of war. 
However, structural bias critics saw that while various areas of international law 
offered protections against supposed violations of women’s rights, it did so either 
for the wrong reasons, or with the wrong emphasis.146 For example, structural bias 
feminist Hilary Charlesworth contended that while rape during armed conflict was a 
definite violation of international humanitarian law, the emphasis in the law was on 
rape being an issue of women’s honor (and thus about the men affected by the 
attack on this honor), and not about women, qua women, as equal subjects under 
international law.147  
 While most structural bias feminists agreed with liberal inclusionist 
feminists on the idea that international institutions did not adequately concentrate 
on women’s issues, their idea for reform was the major restructuring of both 
international law and these institutions in order to accommodate women.148 
Structural bias feminist Dorothy Thomas elucidated this when she stated that “the 
fundamental challenge for the movement for women’s human rights is that it not 
become a reformist project; its recipe should not read ‘Add women and stir’, but 
‘Add women and alter’”.149 Structural bias feminists also classified “a series of 
dichotomies in public international law that perpetuated the inability of 
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international human rights law to attend to women”.150 The most frequently 
discussed of these dichotomies was that of public versus private distinction. 
Structural bias feminists focused much of their critique on women’s “private” lives, 
and generally considered women to be more directly subordinated by their families 
than their states, although they viewed governmental inaction as both the facilitator 
and the perpetuator of this dynamic.151 Structural bias feminist analysis, while 
heavily centered on the public versus private dichotomy, also included various 
others that were viewed as key influencers of the structural bias against women, 
such as the prioritization by international law of the state over civil society.152  
 For both liberal inclusion and structural bias questions, there existed what 
Karen Engle dubs two “elephants in the room”—that is, two crucial questions that 
challenged both critiques.153 The first was question was, “what is feminist about 
women’s human rights advocacy?”154 This question of whether either liberal 
inclusion or structural bias analyses was unique to issues of gender challenged both 
approaches. The second question, or “elephant in the room”, was the issue of 
culture, or the “exotic other female”, whom Engle describes as “an imagined 
women—generally from the third world—who is seen to defend and promote 
practices that liberal and structural bias critics view as violations of women’s 
human rights”.155  
 The two elephants that challenged liberal inclusion and structural bias stages 
of feminist analysis of human rights law acted as a catalyst for the mergence of 
Karen Engle’s third proposed stage: third world feminist critiques of international 
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law, beginning in 1992.156 Engle argues that these “elephants” significantly dented 
two central assumptions of structural bias feminism especially: first the “elephants” 
suggested that other modes of analysis could be similar to feminist methods and 
that, second, that the “male/female divide might not be the defining bias in 
international law”. Engle thus believes that it is not surprising that third world 
critiques of international law emerged in the early 1990’s, when an articulate theory 
of structural bias was being formed, because “the elephants were…in the room from 
the moment feminists began to articulate critiques of human rights law”.157 
Interestingly, Engle divides third world feminist analysis of international law and its 
institutions into two types that mirror the two aforementioned feminist critiques, 
liberal inclusion and structural bias.158 The liberal inclusion position of third world 
feminists is that international law and its establishments has disregarded the 
specific concerns of third world women and should incorporate them within the 
existing structure.159 The structural bias position of third world feminists argues 
that international law is so structurally biased specifically against third world 
women that the international legal system must be significantly modified in order to 
assimilate women into it.160 
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III.  Feminist Engagement with Modern International Criminal Law 
A. The Revival of International Criminal Law 
Simultaneously, the period of time between the late 1980’s and the early 
1990’s signified the reawakening of the international criminal legal project. During 
this time, a large group of Latin American and Caribbean states began seeking an 
international mechanism to address and combat transnational illicit drug trade, an 
issue of crucial importance to these states.161 Per request of the General Assembly, 
the International Law Commission (ILC) began, once more, focusing on drafting a 
statute for a permanent international criminal court. The ILC finalized a draft statute 
in 1994 that created the foundation for increased consideration by an Ad Hoc 
Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, and, 
subsequently, a Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court.162 
1. The First Tribunal: Yugoslavia 
The period of time during which the draft statute for a permanent 
international criminal court was being composed witnessed a return of genocide to 
the European continent, exhibited through mass killings, various forms of ethnic 
cleansing, and extreme violations of international law that occurred during the 
territorial war that accompanied the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia.163 In 
particular, widespread pressure began mounting for an international legal response 
to extensive rapes and other violent abuses against women in the area of conflict.164 
As the war raged on, the UN Security Council attempted to address the conflict 
through a series of resolutions. Resolution 780, adopted on 6 October 1992 directed 
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the Secretary-General at the time, Boutros Boutros-Ghali to form a Commission of 
Experts to record and verify violations of international law committed during the 
conflict.165 Simultaneously, various individual states, as well as both governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations, advocated for the establishment of an ad hoc 
international tribunal with the purpose of placing individual responsibility for the 
abuses documented by the aforementioned Commission of Experts. The initial 
report of the Commission of Experts endorsed the same recommendation.166  
 On 22 February 1993, Resolution 808 was adopted by the Security Council, 
stipulating a unanimous decision by its members “that an international tribunal 
shall be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations 
of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991”, with the Secretary General being tasked with outlined a 
specific proposal for this tribunal.167 Boutros-Ghali subsequently issued a report 
outlining a proposed structure for the tribunal and included a draft statute that 
consisted of clauses constituting existing international humanitarian and criminal 
law.168 The Security Council unanimously adopted the draft statute in Resolution 
827 in May of 1993 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
was henceforth established.169 Based on Article 1 of the adopted ICTY Statute, the 
ICTY ad hoc tribunal has jurisdiction over “serious violations of international 
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 
1991”.170 Articles 2-5 of the Statute gave the court jurisdiction over grave breaches 
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of the laws or customs of war, 
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genocide, and crimes against humanity—thus, the sources for prosecutable 
international law crimes under the ICTY were either international humanitarian law 
or customary law.171 
2. The Second Tribunal: Rwanda 
 A year later, in 1994, Rwanda became a state overwhelmed with genocide of 
massive proportions. Within four months, more than 800,000 Tutsi and Hutu 
citizens were killed—this rate far surpassed that of the Nazi Holocaust.172 Already 
having formed a tribunal for the international law violations that occurred in the 
former Yugoslavia, the Security Council was unable to disregard the critical situation 
in Rwanda, especially since the international community had largely remained 
unresponsive during the heightening conflict.173 Resolution 955 of the Security 
Council, stating that the extensive violations of international law in Rwanda 
constituted threats to international peace and security as outlined in Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter, thus established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR), with its own governing statute.174 Upon establishment by the Security 
Council, both ad hoc tribunals shared an Appeals Chamber and Chief Prosecutor. 
However, with observers’ arguments that Rwandan prosecutions were not receiving 
adequate attention from the Chief Prosecutor, the ICTR was appointed its own Chief 
Prosecutor.175 The ICTR Statute, under Article 1, had jurisdiction over “serious 
violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda 
and Rwandan citizens responsible for such violations committed in the territory of  
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neighboring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.176 Under 
Articles 2-4 of the Statute, the ICTR had jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes based on violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and of Additional Protocol II.177  
3. The Establishment of an International Criminal Court 
 A sense of renewed international faith in the international legal project 
served as a key catalyst for the establishment of a permanent international criminal 
court.178 The Preparatory Committee, whose formation was originally prompted by 
the ILC’s draft statute of 1994, convened six times to produce a completed draft 
Statute that was extensively negotiated at the Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, famously 
known as the Rome Conference, in June and July 1998 in Rome, Italy.179 The 
participants of the conference constituted 160 states, thirty-three 
intergovernmental organizations, and a combination of 236 non-governmental 
organizations.180 The conclusion of the conference was the adoption of the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court by a vote of 120 in favor, 7 against, and 
21 abstentions.181  
B. Women and the New International Criminal Law 
 Throughout the process of the creation and operation of the two tribunals 
and the drafting of the ICC statute, the issue of women was given a comparatively 
significant degree of attention, largely unprecedented in the drafting of non-women 
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specific international instruments.182 In addition, an understanding of the need for 
women’s inclusion in formal positions of these institutions in terms of appointing 
staff was much greater than that shown for the formation of previous international 
institutions.183 Initially, no women were appointed by the Security Council to the 
Commission of Experts created to investigate atrocities in Yugoslavia. However, the 
resignation of one member and death of another led to the Secretary-General 
selecting two women for these vacancies.184 The Commission also formed an all-
woman investigation team including prosecution experts and female mental health 
experts that was in charge of investigating and reporting on allegations of rape and 
sexual violence in Croatia185. A subsequent report issued by the Secretary-General 
stated, “Given the nature of the crimes committed and the sensitivities of victims of 
rape and sexual assault, due consideration should be given in the appointment of 
staff to the employment of qualified women”.186 While this recommendation was not 
included in the final text of either the ICTY or ICTR Statutes, it was incorporated in 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of both Tribunals with regards to the 
appointment of staff to the Victim and Witnesses Unit of the tribunals’ Registry.187 
The Secretary-General’s second and third appointments of the Chief Prosecutor for 
the ICTY and ICTR were both women.188  
 As for the appointment of judges of the tribunals, the selection process is 
done through the General Assembly’s election from a list submitted by the Security 
Council, the criteria for which does not include gender—geographical distribution 
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by virtue of the judges’ nationalities is the main factor.189 The first bench of the ICTY 
included two women out of eleven judges, as did the second bench. The ICTR bench 
included only one female judge.190 While the inclusion of women from the onset was 
an improvement on other international judicial institutions such as the ICJ, female 
representation in the benches of the tribunals was visibly inadequate. Arguments 
from both within and outside feminist circles have maintained that the presence, in 
and of itself, of women in international tribunals is crucial in the field of 
international criminal justice, with regards to increasing the focus on the indictment 
of offenders of crimes against women as well as facilitating the collection of 
evidence from female survivors who can be averse to providing men with 
information about the offenses committed against them.191  
 In general, women’s participation in the course of the legal activity of both 
the tribunals and the ICC was quite significant, largely due to strong forces of 
feminist activism throughout the process, and beforehand. In early 1993, from 
within the International Human Rights Law Group, emerged the Women in the Law 
Project (WILP), which sought to form a small delegation of human rights lawyers to 
investigate allegations of rape and other sexual violence in the former Yugoslavia.192 
Accordingly, a group of four women—Laurel Fletcher, Karen Musalo, Diane 
Orentlicher, and Kathleen Pratt—traveled to the area of conflict and, based on their 
findings, published a report in which their recommendation mirrored that of the 
Security Council’s Resolution 808 with regards to the formation of a special tribunal 
to be formed for the prosecution of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and 
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other crimes of international humanitarian law, with an additional recommendation 
from the WILP for rape specifically to be a primary prosecutable crime.193 
Simultaneously, a group of activists from the International Women’s Human 
Rights Clinic of the City University of New York (CUNY), comprised of Jennifer 
Green, Rhona Copelon, Patrick Cotter, and Beth Stephens, known as the 
Green/Copelon Group, charged to influence participants in the drafting of the ICTY 
Statute, and later published a “blueprint” for the tribunal in which the key 
conclusion was that “the status of rape and other sexual and reproductive crimes 
against women will need to be litigated”.194 These efforts by both the WILP and the 
Green/Copelon Group became the first catalysts for women’s groups, within the 
increasingly connected transnational feminist movement, to mobilize in order to 
construct a “feminist line” about desired reforms in the operation of the tribunals, 
specifically with regards to crimes of rape and sexual violence.195  
1. Women and the ICTY 
 As soon as litigation in the ICTY and ICTR began, feminist activists began 
lobbying judges on the benches of the tribunals to generate changes in cases when 
prosecutors failed to charge of sexual violence.196 A distinct lobbying strategy was 
used by feminists in both tribunals, with two clear examples of each. The first was in 
the Tadic case at the ICTY, which marked an important point when the feminist 
strategy transformed a case into a pivotal moment for the reclassification of rape 
and other forms of sexual violence as “priority crimes” in the tribunals.197 In 
November 1994, Prosecutor Richard Goldstone issued an affidavit on the Dusan 
Tadic Case that according to Rhonda Copelon “gave decidedly secondary 
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consideration to the conditions affecting women and to the severity of rape, for 
example, treating it as less serious than beatings or omitting discussion of it”.198 At 
this point, feminist intervention at the participatory level in the tribunal occurred.  
At the hearing on the deferral application of the Tadic Case, Judge Odio-
Benito, the only women on the ICTY panel trying the case “questioned the 
Prosecutor on these defalcations and an amicus brief, filed by the International 
Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic, the Harvard Human Rights Program, and the 
Jacob Blaustein Institute, underscored the trivialization of violence against 
women”.199 Promptly after that, Prosecutor Goldstone responded to the feminists 
who had written the amicus brief, stating his concurrence with their critiques 
regarding the characterization of rape and that while the declaration’s narrative on 
rape did not reflect the ICTY’s policy of “equating rape to other serious 
transgressions of international law”, “apart from the relevance to charges of 
genocide and crimes against humanity, rape and other sexual assaults will be 
prosecuted under the Statute’s provisions for torture, inhumane treatment, willfully 
causing great suffering or serious injury to body and inhumane acts, and other 
provisions that adequately encompass the nature of the acts committed and intent 
formulated”.200 Prosecutor Goldstone was successfully become engaged in the 
feminist cause, and feminists had finally made their first achievement at the ICTY.  
2. Women and the ICTR 
A similar strategy was used by feminists during litigation at the ICTR. The 
Akayesu case before the tribunal was already in the process of being tried as a case 
mainly concerning widespread murder and other violence, until a witness on the 
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stand spontaneously testified about a case of gang rape. A subsequent witness 
followed suit.201 The only female judge at the ICTR during the trial, Judge 
Navanethem Pillay, questioned the witnesses extensively about their testimonies 
regarding rape. After suspicions that these testimonies did not constitute isolated 
incidents of rape, the judges requested that the prosecution investigate the 
possibility of gender crimes in Rwanda attributable to Akayesu, and if true, consider 
amending the indictment to include charges for rape.202 When the prosecution 
found significant evidence of rape attributable to Akayesu, an amended indictment 
was filed that added charges against Akayesu including rape and other inhumane 
acts as crimes against humanity.203 Feminist advocates interceded at this point in 
swiftly filing an amicus brief, prepared by a representation of 80 feminist NGOs, 
stating that the ICTY Prosecutor had already indicted crimes of sexual violence, and 
discrediting the ICTR for “lagging behind”204. Again, the Prosecutor’s Office was 
responsive, and filed an amended indictment. The Akayesu case was the first in the 
tribunals to issue convictions on charges of rape and sexual violence. While these 
two examples proved that the tribunals witnessed “feminist activists emerging from 
the sidelines”, they were still “scrambling for a place at the table”.205  
3. Women and the ICC 
The United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) took place in Rome, Italy at 
the headquarters of the Food and Agriculture Organization from 15 June to 17 July, 
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1998.206 The participants of the conference constituted 160 states, thirty-three 
intergovernmental organizations, and a combination of 236 non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs).207 The conclusion of the conference was the adoption of the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by a vote of 120 in favor, 7 against, 
and 21 abstentions.208 The Ad Hoc Committee for the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court previously established by the ILC in 1994 was followed 
by a Preparatory Committee, which met on an annual basis between 1996 and 
1998.209 While the work of the Ad Hoc Committee focused on the central issue of 
whether the proposal to create a court was feasible and attainable, the negotiation 
process within the Preparatory Committee focused on the text of the court’s 
statute.210 
 The Preparatory Committee submitted a final working text during the Rome 
Conference that contained 116 articles.211 During the preparation of the working 
text, the Preparatory Committee had realized that the text touched upon a variety of 
different areas of international and criminal law. In order to prevent this issue from 
leading to a lengthy negotiation process, the Committee divided the draft statute by 
subject matter into sections, allocating each subject to a working group.212 The task 
of coordinating between the different sections in order to compose the final daft 
statute was left to the coordinators of the Preparatory Committee. The negotiation 
process at the Rome Conference was modeled closely after that of the Preparatory 
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Committee.213 The draft statute, which consisted of thirteen parts, was divided 
among different working groups. In addition to these working groups, political and 
regional groups, as well as nongovernmental organizations and lobby groups, 
played a significant role in the negotiation process at both the Preparatory 
Committee and the Rome Conference.214 
 The Rome Statute was an important stage in the institutionalization of the 
role of feminist activism in international criminal law largely due to the fact that the 
process as a whole was an important stage in the institutionalization of NGOs in 
general, and governance institutions with regards to the bodies of the United 
Nations. Accounts of participation in the Rome Conference show that both the 
Preparatory Committee and the Rome Conference were witness to a new notion: a 
newfound reliance of stage delegations on NGO activists for information and 
assistance.215 At least thirty NGOs with the word “women” in their names were on 
the list of NGOs officially authorized to participate in the Rome Conference.216  
Human Rights Watch point toward the manner in which “women’s rights activists 
throughout the world—of ever political stripe, faith, sexual orientation nationality, 
and ethnicity—mobilized at each step of the International Criminal Court 
process”—the Feminist Majority Foundation, the Women’s Division of Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and various other participated in the feminist 
“reform effort”, thus suggesting that women’s role in the ICC process constituted the 
participation of a range of feminist NGOs with a variety of feminist views.217 Despite 
the large number of participating women’s NGOs, the majority of accounts of the 
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process point to one specific entity that truly influenced the process for drafting 
laws relevant to the feminist agenda: the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice—this 
conclusion was made in accounts written by both feminists and non-feminists of 
their experience of the ICC Statute drafting process.218  
The Women’s Caucus was a coalition of women’s NGOs consisting of 
approximately 200 feminist activists at the start of the Rome Conference.219 
Collectively, the Women’s Caucus had secured an articulate and coherent platform 
for feminist reform, and used this to lobby extensively during the negotiations 
leading up to the adoption of the Rome Statute. The Women’s Caucus began 
lobbying governmental delegations at the Preparatory Committee in February 
1997.220 By the time of the Rome Conference, the Women’s Caucus had greatly 
expanded its support base to include approximately two hundred different women’s 
organizations from various regions of the world. Besides participation in the 
Preparatory Committee and the Rome Conference, members of the Women’s Caucus 
were assigned with lobbying in their respective countries’ capitals, in order to 
garner the support of diplomatic delegations at the Conference.221 
During the negotiations at both the Preparatory Committee and the Rome 
Conference, the main aim of the Women’s Caucus was the “mainstreaming of gender 
in the creation of this new institution”, the ICC.222 In doing so, the Women’s Caucus 
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worked to reveal perceived deficiencies in existing international law relating to 
crimes of gender and sexual violence.223 Thus, the initial consensus amongst 
feminist activists of the Women’s Caucus was their desire to establish rape, sexual 
violence, and sexual slavery as crimes of international criminal law, and for these 
crimes to be “as high up the hierarchy of ICL codification as they could get them, and 
in terms that derive from their shared feminist understanding of them”.224 It is thus 
important to review the existing legal context in which the efforts of the Women’s 
Caucus began.  
4. The Stage-Setter: International Humanitarian Law 
Most significantly, the body of international humanitarian law served as an 
important “backdrop” and reference point for the feminist reforms that occurred 
during the making of the Rome Statute. This mainly included the Nuremberg 
Charter, with its prohibition of “crimes against humanity”; the Geneva Conventions, 
with their numerous prohibitions on genocide and torture; and, finally, international 
customary law governing the conduct of war.225 Perhaps the most relevant to the 
plight of the Women’s Caucus was Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 
1949 (applying to the treatment of civilians in international armed conflict), which 
states “Women shall be especially protected against any attack on their honor, in 
particular against rape, enforced prostitution, or any other form of indecent 
assault”.226 While the Geneva Conventions were more explicit in this article in the 
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prohibition of sexual violence than any other international legal instrument prior to 
it,227 the language of Article 27 only calls on military forces to protect women from 
rape, enforced prostitution, and other forms of “indecent assault”, without being 
included as part of the Fourth Geneva Convention’s list of “grave breaches”, which 
were the only types of breaches to the Convention that were subject to universal 
jurisdiction, or the duty of all states to investigate and prosecute these breaches 
regardless of the perpetrator committing them or the territory they were committed 
on.228 Thus, Article 27 was a critical reference point for the Women’s Caucus, who 
hoped to ensure that the Rome Statute’s articles moved beyond the limited 
treatment of gender and sexual crimes.229 In addition, the feminist advocates of the 
Women’s Caucus were in uniform agreement that all articles to be drafted regarding 
gender and sexual violence had to be completely disconnected from the concept of 
“attacks on honor”, a premise heavily criticized for problematizing the rape of 
women in terms of their relationship to male or familial relations, and not in terms 
of the violence of the crime itself.230 Finally, Common Article 3 to the four Geneva 
Conventions was an important reference point for the Women’s Caucus because it 
included protection for combatants in “armed conflict not of an international 
character”, and thus did not restrict the Caucus’ reference material to only 
international armed conflict.231 
While the Women’s Caucus used international humanitarian law as its main 
point of reference for the drafting of gender-related content in the Rome Statute, the 
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goal was to do so not due to the idealness of the international humanitarian law 
field, but to use the existing law as a source on which to build upon while 
incorporating feminist critique of IHL. Feminist critique of the international 
humanitarian law field generally point to the innate difficulty in working within a 
field of law that relies on notions of formal equality, whereby the law is “required or 
expected to deliver substantively equal outcomes, particularly given the 
fundamentally diverse ways armed conflict impacts upon men and women”.232 Thus, 
for many feminist critics of IHL, the field itself is “inherently discrimiminatory”, in 
that as a legal field, it automatically prioritizes men, especially male combatants—as 
for women, the field only addresses them when they are referred to with regards to 
the status of victims, or awards them legitimacy due to their position as child-
bearers.233 Feminist critics of IHL Judith Gardam and Michelle Jarvis have pointed to 
the fact that almost half of the 42 provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols relating to women define women in the context of their roles as 
either expectant or nursing mothers.234 Gardam and Jarvis also point to the other 
instances in which women are mentioned in IHL: in the context of crimes of sexual 
violence—even then, protections by IHL for crimes of sexual violence are “couched 
in terms of chastity and modesty of women”.235 Gardam has criticized the general 
notion that the existing provisions protect women due to their association with 
another: “Overall, the existing provisions protect women in terms of their 
relationship with others, such as when pregnant or as mothers, not as individuals in 
their own right. Of some 34 provisions ostensibly providing safeguards for women, 
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a closer inspection reveals that 19 of them are intended primarily to protect 
children. Moreover, the protections for women from sexual violence are couched in 
terms of their honor. In reality a women’s honor is a concept constructed by men for 
their own purposes: it has little to do with women’s perception of sexual 
violence”.236 Critiques of IHL have also centered on the historical lack of prosecution 
of rape as a war crime, in addition to the fact that rape is not included within the 
‘grave breach’ provisions of the Geneva Convention, thus seemingly being placed at 
a “lesser status within the strict hierarchy of war crimes”.237  
5. The Women’s Caucus: An Agenda 
With this existing context in mind, the Women’s Caucus had a specific agenda 
for the relevant gender-related crimes that were to be included in the Rome Statute. 
The first was for the crime of rape to be classified as a grave breach and not a crime 
against humanity. Unlike a crime against humanity, which implied that rape harmed 
humanity, categorizing rape as a grave breach implied the occurrence of a wrong 
against the actual individual, and would allow the gendered focus of the crime to 
become apparent.238 Second, the Women’s Caucus wanted rape to be classified as 
rape, as its own “freestanding crime” in international criminal law, and not as a 
subsection of another crime.239 Moreover, they sought to “delink” the crime of rape 
from the concepts of honor and dignity, again in order to enforce the idea that 
criminal aspect of rape was in no manner tied to patriarchal/familiar relations of 
the victim.240  Finally, the Women’s Caucus’ most ambitious goal was to expand the 
jurisdiction of the ICC to peacetime, and not limit the crimes listed under war crimes 
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and crimes against humanity to times of conflict. Based on such reform, they hoped 
to expand the jurisdiction of the ICC in relation to rape in order to enable its 
prosecution during peacetime as well.241 
6. Women in the ICC Statute: The Final Outcome 
How successful was the Women’s Caucus in articulating their agenda in the 
Rome Statute? The Statute gave the ICC jurisdiction to prosecute and punish crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, genocide, and aggression.242 The main feminist 
contribution was in the category of crimes against humanity and war crimes.243 
Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as subject to the 
jurisdiction of the ICC when they are “committed as part of a widespread or 
systematic attack directed against a civilian population”.244 Article 7 (g) 
incorporates sexual violence, which includes the crimes of “rape, sexual slavery, 
enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of 
sexual violence of comparable gravity”, as a crime against humanity.245  
As for Article 8 of the Statute, which defines war crimes, four main 
subsections are included in the article.246 Of relevance, Article 8 (2) (a) awards 
jurisdiction to the ICC to try individuals who commit grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions, and thus this article only applies to international conflicts.247 Both 
articles then provide a list of applicable crimes. Article 8 (2) (b) is explicitly 
restricted to international conflicts and grants the ICC jurisdiction to try individuals 
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for breaches of the laws and customs of war.248 Articles 8 (2) (c) and 8 (2) (d) apply 
to conflicts “not of an international character”.249 Again, both articles present a list 
of the crimes pertinent to them. The one item on both lists relevant to this topic can 
be found in the subsections prohibiting sexual offences. The two lists of crimes 
applicable to both international and non-international conflicts are identical and 
include a distinctive subsection dedicated to sexual violence—both lists criminalize 
“rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, as defined in Article 
7, paragraph 2 (f), enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence”.250 
The term “any other form of sexual violence” is further restricted to mean 
“constituting a grave breach of the Geneva Convention” if it is an international 
armed conflict and “constituting a serious violation of Common Article 3 to the four 
Geneva Conventions” in the case of non-international armed conflicts.251 
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IV. A Classification of Liberal Inclusionist and Structural Bias Feminists in 
International Criminal Law 
 Janet Halley has provided one of the few concise and detailed accounts of 
feminist engagement in the process at Rome, and thus offers critical insight into the 
operational details of feminists at the Rome Conference, and the steps preceding it. 
Halley has positioned herself as a “sex-positive postmodernist, only rarely and 
intermittently feminist, a skeptic about identity politics, with a strong attraction to 
‘queer’ revelations of the strangeness and unknowability of social and sexual life, 
and a deep distrust of slave-moralistic pretensions to identity-political 
‘powerlessness’”.252 In her accounts of feminist activism at Rome, she has stated that 
the organizational style of feminists during both the tribunals and the process at 
Rome was “overwhelmingly coalitional, resulting in a literary “trace” of feminist 
work that is almost devoid of manifest internal conflict”.253 Halley has concluded 
that this feminist “consensus” that was born out of a supposed variety of 
worldviews and reform agendas was “not, as one might expect, a median liberal 
feminist view that split the difference between conservative and leftist feminist 
ideologies”, but instead constituted a “consensus view [that] was an updated radical 
feminism, strongly committed to a structuralist understanding of male domination 
and female subordination”.254 Halley coined the term “Governance Feminism”, or 
“GFeminism”, to describe a “new feminist organizational style that evolved over the 
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course of the 1990s”, that has exhibited an “incremental but by now quite noticeable 
installation of feminists and feminist ideas in actual legal-institutional power”.255 
 Halley described GFeminism as taking many forms, in that “some parts of 
feminism participate more effectively than others; some are not players at all”.256 
She stresses that while feminists have not “won everything they want”, they are also 
not “helpless outsiders”, but rather have reached a level have reached a stage where 
feminist legal activism has advanced to a stage where “it accedes to a newly mature 
engagement with power”.257 Halley characterizes GFeminism as a complex 
collection of strategies: “It is not a monolithic top-down power. Rather, it piggbacks 
on existing forms by power, intervening in them and participating in them in many, 
simultaneous, often conflicting, and, in many examples anyway, highly mobile ways. 
It has found the novelty and civil-society open-texturedness of “the new 
governance” and “global governance” tobe quite hospitable; it seeks not a monopoly 
of these forms but rather a plentiful presence within them.”258 
However, Halley states that GFeminist involvement in international criminal 
law, specifically in the formation of the ICTs and the ICC, was especially unique in 
that unlike GFeminist rhetoric surrounding other issues, which had consisted of 
various fundamental disagreements within the GFeminist movement, and despite 
the fact that “feminism is uniformly experienced by feminist as a highly contentious 
field, perhaps even defined by its inability to reach consensus”, GFeminist 
involvement in its work on sexual violence in international criminal law was 
“consolidated in its feminist ideology and in its goals”, and that in this sphere, 
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“structuralist-feminist worldview animates both argumentation and rule 
preference”.259 Halley’s argument continues to assert that the substance of this of 
this unified feminist vision evolved throughout the 1990’s, but in a cohesive manner 
that did not display signs of internal dissent from within feminist circles. The 
process started, according to Halley, with a fairly simple uniform commitment to 
ensure that rape was both explicitly prohibited and strongly prosecuted in 
international criminal law, because not doing so was “thought to trivialize or even 
condone rape”.260  
However, Halley contends that over the course of the process of the 
formation of the tribunals and the ICC, feminists involved in the development of the 
international legal sphere attempted to apply their structuralist ideals in making 
rape more than merely a “tool of belligerent forces”, but also “part of a global war 
against women”.261 Halley names this new uniform feminist design “feminist 
universalism”, in that feminists formed their goals in a manner in which women 
were no longer a “particular group of humanity, but a universe of their own. In the 
new feminist universalist worldview, international criminal law norms relating to 
armed conflict could be about women”.262 In a practical sense, this meant that 
feminists’ focus on legal reforms shifted from wartime rape to everyday rape, and 
from the ways in which war was defined by men to the ways in which women 
experience it—and this shift happened collectively, in sync with the general unified 
feminist vision that Halley states was witnessed at Rome.263  
However, Halley’s account of the feminists at Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Rome, 
there are many problems with the picture Halley paints of a unified feminist 
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movement in the process of the tribunals and the drafting of the ICC Statute, and the 
idea that feminist engagement with international criminal law as a field in general 
constituted a “literary “trace” of feminist work that is almost devoid of manifest 
internal conflict”.264 Perhaps more problematic, however, is Halley’s classification of 
liberal versus structuralist feminists in international criminal law. It seems as 
though Halley continues to use the labels liberal and structuralist for feminists who 
were defined as such based on their views and activism in a different field—that of 
international human rights law. In fact, the names of feminists Halley dubs 
structuralist were in fact characterized by Engle as belonging to the structural bias 
era of feminist critique of international human rights law. The include Hilary 
Charlesworth, Rhonda Copelon, Christine Chinkin, Valerie Oosterveld, and other 
feminist activists whose opinions and positions on matters of international human 
rights law clearly placed them under Engle’s classification of “structural bias”.265 
This does not mean, however, that, despite the fact that feminist activism in 
international criminal law constituted many of the same actors present in 
international human rights law, and in many ways transferred various ideologies 
and goals present in feminist activism in international human rights law, the same 
system of classification of these feminists carries onto the field of international 
criminal law. 
A. A Classification of Liberal and Structural Bias Feminists in International Criminal 
Law 
I argue that while the notion of the existence of liberal and structural 
feminists, often in opposition with regards to various substantive issues, exists 
across the fields of both international human rights law and international criminal 
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law, the classification of these feminists differs across fields. Janet Halley defines 
feminist “structuralism” as that which is “strongly committed to a structuralist 
understanding of male domination and female subordination”, contrasted against 
liberal feminism that “split the difference between conservative and leftist feminist 
ideologies.”266 This definition, however, is constricted in its explanation of what 
liberal feminism and structuralist feminism represent in international law. While 
Halley states that feminist activism in international law was a direct transfer of 
actors and ideologies from feminist engagement in international human rights law, 
her definition of the conceptual background behind the ideologies of these feminist 
activists even in international human rights law is incomplete, especially her 
characterization of structural feminism as solely based on and understanding of 
“male domination and female subordination”.267 In the context of international 
human rights law, Engle defined liberal feminism as that which operated under the 
idea that women should, and could, be significantly included in international human 
rights law, and that the law, if properly applied, could successfully incorporate 
issues of women’s rights.268 On the other hand, Engle described structural bias 
feminists in international human rights law as centered around the belief that the 
simple inclusion of women in the international legal structure, as it existed was 
impossible—since international law, according to structural bias feminists, was 
male in nature (and therefore structurally biased against women), the integration of 
women in international law was impossible without changing the entire 
international legal structure.269  
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More generally, liberal feminism can be defined as “the view that women are 
unjustly treated, that their rights are violated, that…reform is needed to improve 
their situation, and that when a states discriminates or deprives women of these 
human rights, it commits an injustice, a violation of international human rights law 
for which it is responsible”.270 Radical structuralist feminists agree that the situation 
of women must be improved, but they believe that “liberal institutions are 
themselves but tools of gender oppression” and that “gender hierarchy necessarily 
infects the process of legal reasoning itself.”271 Another definition is provided by 
Hilary Charlesworth, who defines liberal feminists as those who typically “insist that 
the law fulfill its promise of objective regulation upon which principled decision-
making is based. They work for reform of the law”.272 Thus, the concept of structural 
bias being solely about the concept of men’s domination of women is deficient in 
characterizing the essence of structural bias: while liberal feminists seek the 
inclusion of women in the law, either through proper enforcement, or basic reform 
of the law, albeit within the existing legal structure, structural bias feminists, in 
essence, reject the proposition of simply including women in the law, because they 
view the existing legal tools and structures as biased, and thus seek to reform the 
entire legal structure.  
B. A Model For Liberal Inclusion and Structural Bias for International Criminal Law 
Based on this characterization, Halley’s categorization of liberal and 
structuralist feminists in international criminal law is misplaced. While the 
feminists participating in the tribunals and process at Rome can be correctly 
identified as structural bias under international human rights law, this 
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characterization changes under international criminal law, and a parallel model of 
liberal inclusion and structural bias, as described by Engle for international human 
rights law, emerges for international criminal law as well. Engle described the 
period of liberal inclusion as distinguished by a narrative of “doctrinal inclusion and 
institutional expansion”, and a desire to work within the available legal mechanisms 
based on a belief that women should, and could, be incorporated in the law.273 The 
feminists at Rome did just that: they sought to include women’s issues by working 
within existing legal tools institutions, in a manner that was far from the major 
restructuring of both international law and international legal institutions that 
structural bias feminists in any given field seek. The feminists at Rome followed the 
recipe of “add women and stir”, as put forth by Engle to describe liberal inclusion 
feminists, rather than the “add women and alter” recipe pushed for by structural 
bias critics.  
1. Liberal Inclusion Feminism in International Criminal Law 
 Thus, the process of feminist activism in Rome falls in the liberal inclusion 
phase of feminist activism in international criminal law that seems to have begun in 
1993 with the emergence of the Green/Copelon Group up until, at least, the Rome 
Conference in 1998. Throughout this phase of feminist involvement in international 
criminal law, it seems as though the feminists most heavily engaged in the process, 
those involved in the Women’s Caucus for Gender Justice, viewed international 
criminal law as a field in which women should, and could, be included. They did not 
seek to alter the structure of the international criminal law, but instead sought to 
advocate for the addition of “female-friendly” provisions in the field. They sought for 
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“doctrinal inclusion and institutional expansion”, goals Engle attributes to the liberal 
inclusion feminism of international human rights law.  
The method employed was “add women and stir”, not “add women and 
alter”—the critique was of a lack of existing provisions, not of the structure of 
international criminal law as a whole. Thus, the liberal inclusion feminists of 
international criminal law seem to be those previously characterized as structural 
bias critics by Engle, but under international human rights law. Under international 
criminal law, these same feminists, such as Hilary Charlesworth, Diane Otto, Rhonda 
Copelon, Jennifer Green, and Catherine Mackinnon, no longer appear to be 
advocates of the notion that the simple inclusion of women into the international 
legal structure, vis a vis international criminal law, is impossible, as they did in 
international human rights law. These feminists’ previous emphasis that 
international law could never allow for the integration of women unless the entire 
legal structure was changed does not seem to hold true for their engagement in 
international criminal law: the provisions of the Rome Statute for which the 
Women’s Caucus is mostly credited for not only simply include women in the 
existing structure, but also view as an accomplishment the inclusion of these 
“female-friendly” provisions only as subsets of more general crimes in the Rome 
Statute.  
2. Structural Bias Feminism in International Criminal Law 
 Engle emphasizes in her model of the classification of feminist engagement in 
international human rights law that the various phases of feminist engagement in 
international law overlap.274 The same holds true for feminist engagement in 
international criminal law. For structural bias critics in international criminal law, 
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the notion that it has been viewed as a triumph the results of the Women’s Caucus, 
in this model international criminal law’s liberal inclusion feminists, is problematic. 
Therefore, inherent in structural bias critique in international criminal law is a 
critique of the assumptions and approaches of these now-liberal inclusion feminists 
in international criminal law. Thus, structural bias critique by feminists in 
international criminal law is not only a critique of the structure of the law, but of 
structural issues within liberal feminist inclusion in international criminal law. 
Much of this critique has come from postmodern feminist schools of thought, but 
not exclusively.  
 Certain critique has focused on the problematic structure of international 
criminal law’s inclusion and portrayal of women, as well as problems with the law 
itself. Carol Smart, for example, argues that law, a discourse of power, reproduces 
the female in a “sexualized and subjugated form”, where their bodies “become sites 
of power and a mode of political identity.275 Sharon Marcus argues that women 
represented in most feminist discourses are “already raped” and “already rape-able” 
because the female figure is consistently defined and characterized by sexual 
victimization.276 She is also critical of the notion of criminal justice for sexual 
violence, arguing for a “shift of scene from rape and its aftermath to rape situations 
themselves and to rape prevention”.277  
 Some of the structural bias critique vis a vis international criminal law and 
feminist engagement in the field has focused on problems with feminist 
assumptions about the centrality of rape in international criminal law. Postmodern 
feminist scholar Chiseche Mibenge, for example, argues that the focus on women as 
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victims of rape and sexual slavery can have the effect of “eroticizing rather than 
challenging hegemonic relations”.278 Janet Halley herself, a postmodern critic of the 
liberal inclusion feminism of international criminal law, has argued that prioritizing 
the prosecution or rape may have important adverse side effect, such as the use of 
the “badness” of rape as propaganda for war and the advancement of political and 
national ideologies, and points to the idea that rape may not be the worst thing that 
can happen to women during times of conflict.279 Critiques have also been made 
about the focus on sexual violence against women having the effect of 
backgrounding male victims of gender-based violence, including sexual violence, 
and in the process, constructing an “ideal victim subject”.280 Doris Buss, for example, 
has argued that the raping of Hutu women and men received little attention from 
the ICTR because the “authentic victim subject” was primarily the female Tutsi 
victim.281 This, Buss argues, “reveals the exclusions that are cast in the shadows by 
the glare of ‘rape as an instrument of genocide’”.282  
Other structural bias critique in international criminal law examines 
structural problems with criminalizing wartime rape in international criminal law 
with regards to the issue of consent. Karen Engle herself has been critical of the 
manner in which the increased criminalization of wartime rape can “deny or 
underplay women’s sexual and political agency”, in that the now dominant narrative 
of international criminal law produced by liberal feminists of the field that situates 
women solely as victims of rape can obscure other narratives, including the notion 
that women can have consensual sexual relations with “enemy” men during 
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conflict.283 Halley critiques not only the focus on sexual violence during war as the 
“universal experience of women’s oppression”, but also echoes Engle’s concerns, 
arguing that the criminalization of rape as torture at the ICTY “removes the agency 
of the female victims” because they are unable to consent to sexual relations with 
their male guards.284 Halley and Engle’s argument is that increased international 
criminalization of rape invites the possibility of male perpetrators involved in 
consensual sexual relations with “enemy” females will be unfairly convicted.285  
Much of this structural bias critique of international criminal law and liberal 
inclusions feminists’ engagement with it has come following feminist engagement 
with the tribunals and the process at Rome, but certain critiques, such as those 
provided by Carol Smart and Susan Marcus, came earlier. As previously stated, the 
phases of feminist engagement and critique, that of liberal inclusion and structural 
bias, in international criminal law, overlap. Moreover, while much of structural bias 
critique in international criminal law includes postmodern feminist thought, it is not 
solely restricted to contributions by feminists from the postmodern school of 
thought. 
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V.  The Pattern, and Why It Exists 
 The classification of liberal inclusionist and structural bias in international 
criminal law is critical in highlighting a consistent pattern in feminist activism 
across both domestic and international spheres—a pattern to which international 
criminal law is not an exception. An observation of feminist activism from its early 
days of participation in the plebiscites of the First World War elucidates the 
beginning of a trend that carries on throughout a range of feminist points of 
intervention. With each situation in history during which feminists have interceded 
on behalf of women’s rights, feminist viewpoints have presented themselves, 
practically, under two different umbrellas: that of the liberals, and that of the 
‘others’. These ‘others’ are those who fall outside of the liberal sphere of feminism—
they are the ones who follow liberal feminists’ entry into difference fields, and bring 
with them a critique of liberal feminist tactics and exploits in each area.  
The categorization of these feminists as a collective ‘other’ in relation to 
liberal feminism is in no way out of a lack of regard for the definite fact that these 
feminists come from a variety of different theoretical backgrounds within feminist 
though and activism. Thus, their categorization as a joint ‘other’ is not a 
classification of their theoretical or practical backgrounds, but of their mode of 
interaction with various fields vis-à-vis liberal feminism in these respective fields. 
Whether domestically or internationally, a pattern has often emerged in which 
liberal feminists create an entry point into a certain field in which there is perceived 
room for the improvement, or creation, of women’s rights. These liberal feminists, 
with their motive to reform, and not change, existing structures and laws, use this 
approach in their activism to gain ‘accomplishments’ for women’s rights in various 
spheres.  
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It is at this point that ‘other’ feminists often intervene: as a reaction to the 
‘changes’ made by liberal feminists in these different spheres. With them, ‘other’ 
feminists bring criticism of the liberal feminist method, and liberal feminist 
‘achievements’. Additionally, little interaction, let alone cooperation, occurs between 
the liberals and the ‘others’. Instead, ‘other’ feminists’ entry into different areas of 
feminist activism is largely reactionary to that of liberal feminist work. The work of 
‘other’ feminists lies mostly in their critique of liberal feminists’ work, and not in 
attaining what liberal feminists view as tangible ‘accomplishments’ with regards to 
social, political, economic, and legal reform. However, liberal feminists do not seem 
to engage with criticism from ‘other’ feminists, but instead, after making ‘changes’ 
within various fields, proceed onto other areas with perceived deficiencies in the 
rights of women.  
Emphasizing equal individual rights and liberties for women and men is the 
most widely accepted social and political philosophy within feminist schools.286 This 
does not only hold true for international law, but for liberal feminism across various 
spheres, including domestic ones. Liberal feminism probably enjoys greater popular 
support than other feminist schools for a variety of reasons. Generally, liberal 
feminism’s aims are more moderate and its views pose less of a challenge existing 
structures and systems.287 Liberal feminists do not seek revolutionary changes in 
society—they seek reforms within the existing social, political, and economic 
structure, and work within the available system. It has also been argued that 
feminist liberals, with their roots in classical liberalism, ‘rely upon rationality and 
the ‘reasoned argument’ to create change’.288 
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Contemporary liberal feminists tend to believe that the values and structures 
of liberal democracy, in and of themselves, have the potential to allow for gender 
equality if women were allowed to fully participate in these value systems and 
structures. Thus, liberal feminism offers a voice from within feminist schools that 
does not connect addressing gender oppression with more radical notions of 
creating new political, economic, and social systems.289 Thus, liberal feminists’ more 
‘moderate’ views and tactics are those that often lead to the most considerable 
social change with regards to feminist activism for women’s rights.  
The preeminence of liberal feminism also owes much to the fact that it 
encompasses a wide variety of related, yet distinctive, views that collectively and 
comfortable fit within a framework of political liberalism. Thus, liberal feminism 
does not essentially challenge existing capitalist economic structures, for example, 
nor does it recommend separatism, as do more radical feminists. Instead, liberal 
feminism’s aims lie in extending a wider range of freedoms to women within the 
existing liberal democratic society, whether domestic or international, as well as 
both criticizing practices that deny women equal protection under the law as well as 
condemning laws that de facto discriminate against women.290  
Specifically with regards to law, liberal feminists do not regard the legal 
system itself, domestic or international, as being the contributing factor to the 
inferior position of women. They assume that the law is generally rational, impartial 
with regards to sex, and capable of achieving justice. Thus, liberal feminists often 
work for reform of the law, insisting that the law fulfill what they believe is its 
objective of impartial regulation, not a dismantling of the legal structure itself. In the 
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international arena, liberal feminists also seek to increase women’s participation in 
the making of international law, and within the institutions that employ it. 
Moreover, liberal feminist views are often more ‘appealing’ in that they ‘reject 
utopian visions of an ideal society in favor of one that eliminates coercion and 
promotes autonomous choices amongst its citizens’.291  
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CONCLUSION 
Liberal feminists themselves acknowledge that despite more than 200 years of 
struggle, they have not yet attained their goal of sexual equality. However, ‘other’ 
feminists have gone further in arguing that the liberal feminist agenda can never 
provide meaningful equality to all women: operating within the confines of the 
current domestic and global political, social, and economic structures, it fails to 
redress the inequities that constrain different women. For many ‘other’ feminists, 
especially structural bias critics, the simple inclusion of women into international 
law is impossible, since they view international law as inherently male, and 
therefore structurally biased against women. For ‘other’ feminists, a major 
restructuring of both international law itself and its institutions is required in order 
to truly accommodate women. As Dorothy Thomas put it in critiquing liberal 
feminist activity in the field of international human rights law, “The fundamental 
challenge for the movement for women’s human rights is that it not become a 
reformist project; its recipe should not read, “Add women and stir,” but “Add 
women and alter.”292  
With regards to feminist activity in international criminal law, academic and 
legal reception of the final outcome of the aforementioned Rome Statute articles 
relating to gender and sexual violence in the Rome Statute has varied. The majority 
of published responses to the manner of inclusion of gender and sexual violence 
crimes in the Rome Statute have praised the Women’s Caucus for its achievements 
in enforcing accountability for sexual violence under international crime. 
Proponents of this view state that the inclusion of female-friendly provisions in the 
formation of the ICC is a historical moment in international law and is a crucial step 
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to protecting women and creating gender equality in the international legal 
sphere.293 Others, however, including certain feminists themselves, have stated that 
the provisions of the Rome Statute advocated for by the Women’s Caucus are not 
“the great leap that some women’s organizations claim”.294 
Critiques of the provisions have included several aspects. The first is the 
issue of the definition of rape under the statute, in that it is a subsection of the 
articles on crimes against humanity and war crimes. Critics have pointed to the 
problematic nature of these articles, in that the ICC only has jurisdiction over rape 
crimes when they can be linked to wider plans towards the community as a 
whole.295 The second issue certain critics have proposed is that by presenting the 
ICC’s jurisdiction over wartime rape as a success, less attention is being paid to the 
concept that gender and sexual violence is a phenomenon of peacetime as well.296 In 
recent years, critics of the provisions, many of whom are feminist activists 
themselves, have pointed to the provisions as possible setbacks, instead of 
achievements. The debate regarding the efforts of feminist activists in the sphere of 
international transitional justice is still ongoing.  
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